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INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CIVIL LIABILITIES FOR DEFECTIVE
PROSPECTUSES: BANGLADESHI LAWS COMPARED WITH THEIR
EQUIVALENTS IN INDIA AND MALAYSIA
S.M. Solaiman"
INTRODUCTION
The Bangladesh securities market came into being in 1954, but it still
remains in its infancy. The Disclosure-Based Regulation (DBR), a regulatory
regime useful for the developed securities markets, was adopted in January
1999 for an embryonic securities market in Bangladesh by discarding the
previous merit regulation. The new philosophy came into effect without any
significant changes being made in the old legal and regulatory framework of
initial public offerings (IPOs).
The law defining the rights of both the shareholders and the quality of
their enforcement is fundamental to corporate governance and finance.' An
empirical study reveals that the quality of the "legal environment"2 in a market
for IPO has a notable effect on the ability of firms to raise funds from the
public.' "Good legal rules" are of paramount importance in all successful
examples of securities market development.' Rhee observes that a strong
regulatory framework to protect the integrity of the IPO market, as well as the
investors, is essential for a successful DBR' Generally, the regulation of
securities markets is based on the liabilities for the infringements of regulatory
provisions and their enforcement. One of the core tenets of IPO regulation is
the imposition of liability on the persons involved in the preparation of a
prospectus.6 This regulation is necessary to ensure accuracy, adequacy and
* Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia.
1. Rafael La Porta et al.,Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149(1997);
Rafael La Porta et aL, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. EcON. 3, 15 (2000).
2. "Legal environment" refers to the quality of legal protections for investors, the quality of laws
and their enforcement. See Rafael La Porta et al, supra note 1, at 1132.
3. Id. at 1146.
4. Simon Johnson, Coase and the Reforms of Securities Market, 16 INT'L EcON. J. 1, 2 (2002).
5. S. Ghon Rhee, Rising to Asia's Challenge: Enhanced Role of Capital Markets, in ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK, RISING TO THE CHALLENGE IN ASIA: A STUDY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: VOLUME
1: AN OVERVIEW 108, 151 (2000).
6. In Bangladesh, the Companies Act of 1994 does not define the term "prospectus." However,
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timeliness of the material information in relation to both the issue and the
issuer concerned.
Companies willing to go public are required to disclose to all potential
investors information which is necessary to make informed investment
decisions.' The availability of remedies against the violation of disclosure
requirements primarily depends on "the suitability of liability regime."8 Civil
liabilities have been imposed on certain persons for the inclusion of "untrue
statements"9 in a prospectus. But the liability of several others is unclear.
Civil liabilities for a defective prospectus in Bangladesh are comprised of the
statutory liability as well as liability under the common law of torts.
This paper examines the inadequacy and loopholes of the current civil
liability provisions for the prospectus in Bangladesh in the light of their
equivalents in India and Malaysia. However, references to the relevant laws
in some developed countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia and
Canada will be made where appropriate. Although the Bangladesh securities
market cannot be compared with the markets in the developed economies, the
comparisons seem to be justified in this study for contextual perspective.
The findings of the discussion suggest that the Bangladeshi laws
governing civil liabilities for disclosures in prospectuses are flawed in
multifarious ways with weaknesses such as ambiguities and shortcomings in
identifying potentially liable persons, and softness in terms of the scope for
defences. Such flaws ultimately favour the wrongdoers at the expense of the
investors affected by the contravention of the legal requirements of
disclosures. This is so because in the absence of an effective enforcement
mechanism, the weaknesses in the provisions for prospectus liabilities have
increased the vulnerability of investors.
its definition has been provided in Rule 2(d) of Public Issue Rules 1998. According to this definition, a
prospectus means "any document prepared for the purpose of communicating to the general public a
company's plan to offer for sale [of] its securities." For the convenience of discussion in this paper, the
term prospectus(es) inclusively includes the original prospectus, amendments to the prospectus and
supplementary prospectuses.
7. See Companies Act of 1994 §§ 134-35 (Bangl.); Public Issue Rules of 1998 R. 7(B) (Bangl.).
8. In this analysis, "the suitability of liability regime" refers to the liability provisions suitable to
the needs of the IPO market in Bangladesh and effective machinery for the enforcement of these provisions.
9. For the interpretation of provisions in relation to prospectuses in Bangladesh, the expression
"untrue statements" includes the statements misleading in the form and context in which it is included, and
any omission from a prospectus which is calculated to mislead. See Companies Act of 1994 § 143 (Bangl.).
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OBJECTIVES OF PROSPECTUS LIABILITIES
Liabilities for wrongdoing in any respect generally create deterrence for
the wrongdoers. Investors in the securities markets are best protected by a
legal framework which is based on deterrence.' Therefore, the main thrust
of imposing liability for a defective prospectus is to provide protection to
investors.
In respect of raising funds for companies from the public, the objectives
of civil liabilities are twofold: first, to facilitate compensation for the victims
of the defective prospectus; and second, to deter the persons involved in the
preparation of prospectuses from flouting disclosure requirements."
CIVIL LIABILITIES FOR DEFECTIVE PROSPECTUSES
The civil liability, in this discussion, refers to the compensation of
investors or subscribers who may have sustained loss or damage by
subscribing for an IPO. 2 A public offering of shares involves several distinct
areas of activity which commonly include promoters and directors of the
issuing company, accountants/auditors, lawyers, underwriters and issue
managers (IPO Coalition). The Companies Act of 1994 (CA'94) and the
Securities and Exchange Ordinance of 1969 (SEO'69), as well as the common
law of torts, provide civil liabilities for a defective prospectus.
The CA'94 and the SEO'69 have imposed civil liability on certain
persons to compensate the subscribers who sustained loss or damage from
their subscriptions to an IPO on the faith of the prospectus. 14 In addition to
statutory liabilities, those persons are also liable under the common law of
torts to compensate each investor who suffers loss or damage by investing in
an IPO having relied on the defective prospectus. The SEO'69 and the
common law also entitle the investors to rescind their investment contracts.
This remedy is available against the issuer. The investors' right to rescind
their investment contracts is widely prevalent in common lawjurisdictions and
does not punish the persons involved in the preparation of the prospectus.
10. Greg Golding, Underwriters' Liability in Australian Securities Offerings, 11 Co. & SEC. L.J.
401, 406 (1993).
11. Id. at 405.
12. The terms "investors" and "subscribers" will be used interchangeably in this article.
13. The expression "IPO Coalition" has been used in Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer
Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial Public Officers, 39 J.L. & ECON. 545 (1996).
14. Companies Act of 1994 § 145 (Bangl.); Securities and Exchange Commission Ordinance of
1969 § 23 (Bangl.).
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Moreover, this remedy appears to be useless when the promoters and directors
misappropriate the funds raised by the defective prospectus and the company
goes into liquidation, leaving inadequate or no funds to implement the
rescission of investment contacts. Furthermore, as the residual claimants of
the company, the shareholders are entitled to get equitable shares in the
company's remaining assets after meeting the claims of the creditors. 5
Therefore, the shareholders will be able to recover their money from the
residual assets of the company, if any are left after liquidation, without any
litigation for rescission of their investment contracts. In addition, the burden
of liability of an issuer "falls primarily on innocent shareholders." 6 For these
reasons, the present study will not focus on the investors' right to rescind their
contract against the issuers. The paper will concentrate on the liability of the
persons involved in the process of raising funds from the public for the
company. It will not look at the issues concerning the liability of the company
which are beyond its scope.
PERSONS LIABLE FOR DEFECTIVE PROSPECTUSES UNDER THE COMPANIES
ACT OF 1994
Section 145(1) of the Companies Act of 1994 imposes liability on certain
persons for any "untrue statement"'" included 8 in the prospectus. It provides
that subject to the provisions of this section, the following persons will be
liable to compensate the subscribers to a given public offer of securities:
(a) every person who is a director of the company at the time of the issue of the
prospectus;
(b) every person who has authorised himself to be named and is named in the
prospectus either as a director, or as having agreed to become a director, either
immediately or after an interval of sometime;
(c) every person who is a promoter of the company, and
15. Creditors generally include the holders of debt securities, such as debentures, and providers of
loans to the company. They are also called the fixed claimants of the company as opposed to the equitable
claimants.
16. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets:
Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 694.
17. According to the statutory interpretation of the term, an "untrue statement" implies such a
statement which includes a statenent misleading in the form and context in which it is included and which
omits to state information therein that is calculated to mislead. See Companies Act of 1994 § 143(1)
(Bangl.).
18. In respect of prospectus, the term "included" denotes "included in the prospectus itself or
contained in any report of menorandum appearing on the face thereoforby reference incorporated therein
or issued therewith." Companies Act of 1994 § 143(2) (Bangl.).
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(d) every person who has authorised the issue of the prospectus.
This section clearly imposes liability on the directors and promoters, but it is
unclear whether or not the other persons involved in the preparation of the
prospectus, such as auditors, lawyers, underwriters and issue managers, fall
within the ambit of this liability.
The above provisions of the CA'94 have never been interpreted by the
courts in Bangladesh due to a dearth of cases, although there have been many
allegations of the contravention of this section. 9 Therefore, the liability of
19. AIMS of Bangladesh Limited cancelled their commitment for underwriting the flotation of
Modem Food Products Limited after the publication of the prospectus. AIMS decided on this cancellation
after detecting that the audited account of the company provided to them by the Merchant Bankers and
Issue Manager of the issue differed from the one published on the prospectus and concealed material facts.
The audit report on the prospectus had been qualified by the auditors for not complying with Bangladesh
Standard of Accounting (BSA) 4 and 16 on fixed asset schedule. It was also exposed that the sponsors of
the issuer are bank loan defaulters. The bad loan liability and litigation against them have been understated
and concealed at Taka 5.205 million against actual Taka 13.465 million. See AIMS, AIMS Ditches Modern
Food, WKLY. MARKET REV., 10 July 2000, at I; M.S. Rahman, AIMS Backs Down on Pledge to
Underwrite Modern Food Audited Accounts Differ from Prospectus Statement, DAILY STAR (Dhaka,
Bangl.), 3 July 2000.
The SEC has sued the directors of Wonderland Toys, Ltd. and its issue manager (National Securities
and Consultant, Ltd.) for allegedly "inducing the investors into purchasing its shares by artificially showing
a rosy picture of the company." The company went for an IPO of Taka 50 million. In its prospectus, the
company showed that Wonderland's counterpart in Hong Kong had provided them with the plant and
machinery as per a joint venture agreement and all the machinery had been installed. The SEC filed the
case based on its inquiry reports. The SEC complaint stated that "[a]ll these claims are outright false,
deceptive and an illegal bid to gain by providing false information with a view to luting investors into
buying its shares." It may be mentioned here that Wonderland failed to make any profit and pay dividend
for two consecutive years. For detail, see M.S. Rahman, Court Summons Wonderland Toys Directorsfor
AllegedDeception: Fake 1P0 Info Make Investors Buy Scrips, DAILY STAR (Dhaka, Bangl.), 19 Jan.2001.
Audit firm M/S Ata Khan & Co. had been accused of certifying false statements by two companies
on their balance sheets. The SEC inquiry as well as the investigation of the disciplinary committee of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB), the professional statutory body of accountants,
found the firm guilty for certifying balance sheets of two companies showing inflated amounts of bank
liability. These two green field companies' sponsors sought to raise Taka 360 million from the IPOs. For
details, see M.S. Rahman, Auditing Firm under SEC-ICAB Fire, DAILY STAR (Dhaka, Bangl.), 21 Apr.
1998.
Fu-Wang Ceramic Industry Limited, a Taiwanese-owned company, concealed tax evasive information
in its prospectus for an IPO to raise Taka 50 million which was revealed during the subscription period.
Such information is required to be published under the prevailing law and international accounting
practices, which have been adopted by Bangladesh. See T.I. Khalidi, IPO to Raise Th 5 cr by Taiwanese
Tiles Producers: Fu-Wang Conceals Information, DAILY STAR (Dhaka, Bangl.), I I Feb. 1998.
Madina Shoe Industries Ltd. submitted a petition for IPO for the SEC's approval. The petition
enclosed a due diligence certificate with the forged signature of a director. Later, the SEC turned down the
application. The SEC detected the forgery when directly contacting the director. See M.S. Rahman, SEC
Turns Down Madina Shoe's IPO Petition: Allegation of Submitting False Documents, DAILY STAR
(Dhaka, Bangl.), 12 June 2000.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE
various participants in an "IPO coalition,"'2 other than the directors and
promoters, has yet to be determined under these provisions. The absence of
specific mention of their liabilities in the legislation, coupled with a lack of
judicial interpretation, may imply to the public the misunderstanding that all
members of an IPO coalition are not liable for the untrue statements in the
prospectus. This impression may induce the persons involved in the
preparation of the prospectus to commit wrongs and preclude the investors
from seeking remedies under this section.
In pursuance of the articulation of Section 145(1) referred to, one may
perceive that persons other than the directors and promoters may fall within
the expression "every person who has authorised the issue of the prospectus"
and thereby be liable for untrue statements included in the prospectus. But the
CA'94 does not provide any explanation as to who authorises the issue within
the meaning of the section. Moreover, the provisos added to Section 145(1),
read with Section 138 of the CA'94, suggest that auditors, legal advisers,
attorneys, solicitors and bankers to the issues of the company shall not be
liable under this section as a person "who has authorised the issue" merely
because of giving consent to the issue of the prospectus as required under
Section 138 of the CA'94. The provisos further state that they may be liable
if their names are shown in the prospectus as experts and the untrue statements
in question purporting to be made by them are included therein. But the
statutory definition of'"expert ' provided in Section 139(2) does not clearly
include any of them.
The SEC suspended the IPO of Raspit Data Management and Telecommunications Ltd by accusing
the companyof inflating its assets. An investigation conducted upon a complaint by some internet services
providers led to this accusation. See M.S. Rahman, SEC Suspends Raspit IPO, Orders Special Audits:
Auditor to be Selected by the Company, DAILY STAR (Dhaka, Bangl.), 15 Sept. 2000.
Keya Cosmetic Ltd., a reputed company, allegedly concealed the evasion of a huge amount of Value
Added Tax (VAT) in its prospectus. The company offered IPO for Taka 25 million whereas the alleged
amount of evaded tax was Taka 390 million. See M.S. Rahman, Alleged Tax Evasion by Keya: SEC May
Ask Co. to Issue Public Notice, DAILY STAR (Dhaka, Bangl.), 15 June 2001. There are more cases
supporting the adoption of unfair means by the issuers, intermediaries and/or auditors to raise funds for the
firms from the public, but could not be mentioned due to space constraints.
20. An "IPO coalition" in this article includes all persons involved in the preparation of a
prospectus.
21. The term "expert" includes an engineer, a valuer, an accountant and any other person whose
profession or reputation gives authority to a statement made by him. Prospectuses often include reports
from valuers or geologists, who usually make reports on the viability of the businesses of the issuers. The
term expert bears the same meaning in all three jurisdictions, Bangladesh, India and Malaysia. See
Companies Act of 1994 § 139(2) (Bangl.); Companies Act of 1956 § 59(2) (India); Companies Act of 1965
§ 4 (Malay.).
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In this respect, the corresponding provisions of Section 62 of the
Companies Act of 1956 (CA'56) of India is exactly same as Section 145 of the
CA'94. Moreover, Section 46 of the Companies Act 1965 (CA'65) of
Malaysia is little different from the companies legislation of Bangladesh and
India. Section 46(1) of the CA'65 imposes liability on the directors,
promoters or every person who "authorised or caused the issue of the
prospectus."22 The same ambiguity exists in Malaysia too, because the CA'65
does not specify the persons who fall within the meaning of authorisation or
causation under Section 46(1). Therefore, the question of liability of the
persons other than the promoters and the directors for a defective prospectus
is also unclear in Malaysia under company law. No case law has been found
under this section for the judicial interpretation of this ambiguity in any of the
three countries: Bangladesh, India and Malaysia. However, in a similar
context, judicial observations in some common law jurisdictions show that
directors fall within the purview of the meaning of the authorisation of issue
of a prospectus.23 One writer observes that a "class of possible defendants"
would not be liable under Section 146(1) and "[s]uch a class would include
the advising solicitors, merchant bankers and reporting accountants, who
assisted in the preparation of theprospectus."'24 According to this observation,
auditors, underwriters, issue managers and lawyers are not liable for defective
prospectuses under the above section in Malaysia.
The ambiguity of the liability of those persons becomes more apparent
from the comments of one writer on Section 62 of the CA'56 of India.
According to this writer, Section 62 of the CA'56 restricts the civil liability
to the promoters, directors and experts.25 As a result, it can be said that a
general perception persists in those countries, including Bangladesh, that the
auditors, lawyers, underwriters and issue managers do not fall within the
meaning of "authorising the issue of the prospectus."
Those persons are not even considered to be liable within the meaning of
"promoters" as long as they are only providing professional services. In Re
Great Wheal Polgooth Co., it was held that "a solicitor is not an officer of the
company [and he or she] is not to be treated as a promoter of the company.
2 6
Hence, in the absence of judicial interpretation, the academic views seem to
22. Companies Act of 1965 § 46(1)(d) (Malay.).
23. For example, Registrar of Companies v. Brierley, [1965] N.Z.L.R1 809, 815 (S.C.) (N.Z.).
24. CHEE KEONG LOW, SECURITIES REGULATION IN MALAYSIA 118 (1997).
25. SANJIv AGARWAL, C.M. BINDAL & VIJAY K. JAIN, COMMENTARY ON THE COMPANIES ACT,
1956 at 638 (2001).
26. (1883) 53 Ch. D. 42 (U.K.).
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suggest that Section 145 of the CA'94 of Bangladesh does not impose any
liability on the lawyers, auditors, underwriters and issue managers despite
their crucial responsibility in the preparation of a prospectus. In fact, they are
very influential in making disclosures in a prospectus through which they have
an impact on the disclosure's capacity to deceive the investors.27 Although the
above statutes of Bangladesh, India and Malaysia are unclear about the civil
liability of persons other than the promoters, directors and experts, the
Securities Commission Actof 1993 in Malaysia contains very clear provisions
regarding the liability of the persons in question. Section 57 of the Act
imposes liability on all persons involved in the preparation of a prospectus to
compensate investors for their loss and damages resulting from false and
misleading statements in the prospectus. It clearly identifies the liable persons
and these persons are, amongst other, directors, promoters, principal advisers,
underwriters, auditors, and advocates of the issuer (lawyers) in relation to the
issue. 8 However, the defendants have a range of statutory defences against
any claim of investors under this section. The defences29 are: due diligence, 0
expertisation,3' reliance on public statement 2 and withdrawal of consent.33
All of these defences are available under company laws which will be
discussed later in this paper. It is therefore clear that all of the above persons
are liable for a defective prospectus in Malaysia; but there are no similar
provisions in Bangladesh and India.34
In addition to the legislation of Malaysia, there are some statutory laws
as well as judicial decisions which clearly impose civil liability on the above
professionals and intermediaries involved in the process of prospectus
preparation." Bangladeshi law is weaker in relation to the civil liabilities of
underwriters, issue managers, auditors and lawyers. These legal lacunae result
27. Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule lOB-5: Chiarella "s History, Central
Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 891-92 (1995).
28. For details, see the text of § 57 of the Securities Commission Act of 1993 (Malay.).
29. All defences bear the same meaning as analyzed earlier in the discussion an the civil liability
under company laws.
30. Securities Commission Act of 1993 § 59 (Malay).
31. Id. §60.
32. Id. § 62.
33. Id. § 63.
34. The equivalent of the Securities Commission Act of 1993 (Malaysia) is the Securities and
Exchange Commission Act of 1993 (Bangladesh) and the Securities and Exchange Board of India Rules
of 1992 (India).
35. For details, see Securities Act of 1933 §§ I 1- 12 (U.S.); Financial Services Act of 1986 § 168(l)
(U.K.); Securities Act of 1990 § 130 (Ont.); Corporations Act of 2001 §§ 728-729 (Austl.). Judicial
precedents will be discussed later.
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in weaker protection of investors for which the current civil liability
provisions are unhelpful to protect investors in the disclosure regime in
Bangladesh. The DBR is avowed to be a system adopted for the development
of securities markets, but as some commentators have stated, the shortcomings
of the protection of the investing public have adverse effects on this
development.36
Underwriters, issue managers and auditors provide separate certificates
to the effect that they have examined the prospectus issued to the public.
Their certificates are published in the relevant prospectus. Similarly, lawyers
have an important role to play in the corporate fundraising process. For their
involvement in the IPO process, lawyers are also subject to the civil liability
in other jurisdictions as will be discussed later in this article. The roles of
underwriters, auditors, lawyers and issue managers with respect to a
prospectus and the rationale for their liability for a defective prospectus are
discussed below.
FUNCTIONS OF UNDERWRITERS AND RATIONALE FOR THEIR CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR PROSPECTUSES
Pricing of shares in a public offer is very crucial for investor protection.
In Bangladesh, underwriters justify the price of the shares in an IPO and
provide a due diligence certificate which is included in the prospectus. The
imposition of civil liability on the underwriters has been emphasised to ensure
prospectus integrity from the viewpoint of investor protection.37 The
following are arguments usually advanced for the liability of the underwriters:
i. As the most independent person, an "underwriter is in a position
to evaluate and investigate" the various facets of the proposed issue, and
the underwriter "must make some reasonable attempt" to do it.3"
ii. Investors reasonably rely on underwriters "to check the accuracy
of the statements and the soundness of the offer.
39
iii. Underwriters are in a position to impose their will on the issuers
in order to ensure the accuracy of disclosures in prospectuses.4"
36. Rafael La Porta et aL, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. EcON. 1113, 1152 (1998).
37. Golding, supra note 10, at 43 1.
38. Lynn Nicholas, The Integrated Disclosure System and Its Impact upon Underwriters Due
Diligence: Will Investors be Protected, 1 ISEC. REG. L.J. 3, 11 (1983). See also Stephen P. Fernis et al.,
An Analysis and RecommendationforPrestigious Underwriter Participation in IPOs, 17 J. CORP. L. 58 1,
583 (1992).
39. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir. 1973).
40. Ernest L. Folk, Civil Liabilities under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA.
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All of the above reasons for the prospectus liability of underwriters are
related to the interests of investors. The liability of underwriters therefore
becomes more desirable for the restoration of public confidence in the
operation of the Bangladesh IPO market which has been seriously lacking in
an environment conducive to the DBR for several years. The absence of
prerequisites for the DBR, including shortcomings and ambiguities of the civil
liability regime, has prevailed in the Bangladesh securities market for years.
Hence, the civil liability of underwriters is important for investor protection
in the IPO market.
FUNCTIONS OF AUDITORS AND RATIONALE FOR THEIR LIABILITY FOR
PROSPECTUSES
The accuracy of disclosures in a prospectus largely depends on the role
of the auditors who attach a due diligence certificate to the prospectus
concerning the accuracy of the information in relation to the financial status
of the issuer. Generally, the auditors are the people who are hired first for the
prospectus and they "must observe inventory and confirm accounts
receivable" to furnish their reports."' Auditors often have great influence over
the contents of the prospectus that deceive investors. They usually work
behind the scenes and it is reasonable to impose liability on the auditors
because "they have an impact on the disclosure's capacity to deceive" as is the
case of underwriters.43 In the U.S., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has suggested that primary liability be imposed on those who have a
significant role in drafting fraudulent disclosure materials and that accountants
have been directly identified as a source of these materials.44 A district court
in California has expressed the view that the simple involvement or
participation in a fraudulent disclosure is sufficient for liability to be
imposed.45 A U.S. court in Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares observed that
a defendant may be liable for participating considerably in a fraudulent
scheme even if the misrepresentations are not made directly by the
L. REv. 1, 81 (1969).
41. Beatty & Welch, supra note 13, at 548.
42. Melissa Harrison, The Assault on the Liability of Outside Professionals: Are Lawyers and
Accountants Offthe Hook, 65 U. Cn. L. REv. 473, 533 (1997).
43. Langevoort, supra note 27, at 891-92.
44. Dannenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc.), 38 F.3d 1078, 1090 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1994).
45. In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
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defendant." Thus, the participation of auditors in the preparation of a
defective prospectus should attract liability.
Further, from a different point of view, a study has shown that the level
of effort of auditors in the performance of auditing depends on the extent of
the liability. 47 Similarly, another study suggests that potential liability works
as an incentive for auditors to work hard and provide insurance for the
investors.48
The importance of the role of auditors in the preparation of a prospectus
is evident in the reasons aforesaid. Therefore, the imposition of civil liability
on the auditors for a defective prospectus is quite reasonable.
FUNCTIONS OF LAWYERS AND RATIONALE FOR THEIR LIABILITY FOR
PROSPECTUSES
A lawyer provides advice to the issuer on the requirements of disclosure
and certifies compliance with the law in preparing a prospectus. A lawyer is
also responsible for guiding the issuer through various regulatory hurdles. A
legal framework contributes to make the role of lawyers more credible by
imposing potential liability on them for providing improper advice to the
issuer and attaching untrue certification to the prospectus regarding its
compliance with the law. It is argued that lawyers are not generally regarded
as experts in respect of IPOs.49 They may not be experts in relation to the
whole contents of a prospectus, but lawyers are expected to have expertise on
the legal aspects of the prospectus. By virtue of their knowledge of the law,
lawyers can provide opinions like experts on certain contents of a prospectus.
For example, legal counsel may be held liable if an expert opinion is offered
in the prospectus concerning the tax status of the issuer if the opinion is found
to be inaccurate.5" Apart from offering expert opinions, mere participation of
professionals (lawyers) like underwriters and auditors in the process of
prospectus preparation "can provide an implicit certification" to potential
investors about the accuracy of disclosures.5' Thus, simple involvement or
46. 884 F. Supp 1398, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
47. See Frank Gigler, Discussion of an Analysis ofAuditor Liability Rules, 32 J.AcCT. REs. 61,64
(1994).
48. Rachel Schwartz, Legal Regimes, Audit Quality and Investment, 72 AcCT. Rv. 385, 397-98
(1997).
49. Beatty & Welch, supra note 13, at 552.
50. See Schneider v. Traweek, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,419 (Court 1990).
51. Royce R. Barondes, Professionalism Consequences of Law Firm Investments in Clients: An
Empirical Assessment, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 379, 382 (2002).
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participation of lawyers in a fraudulent prospectus should be considered
sufficient for the imposition of civil liability on them as has been mentioned
earlier in relation to auditors.
There may be some arguments against the liability of lawyers on the plea
that the service provided by lawyers in respect of the prospectus is basically
of an advisory nature. Actually, their role is not limited to merely providing
advice to the issuer, rather it extends to verifying compliance with the legal
requirements of the prospectus contents and regulatory barriers in obtaining
the regulator's consent to the issue of the prospectus. Legally, an issuer is
obligated to furnish only true information in the prospectus. At the same time,
the issuer is required to refrain from incorporating false, misleading or
deceptive information and non-disclosure of material facts as argued earlier.
The lawyers get involved in the process of prospectus preparation at a much
later stage than that of the auditors to verify the legal requirements for the
prospectus." Lawyers have the opportunity to remind the issuer of the
specific needs or shortcomings of the prospectus. It is therefore argued that
the lawyers' role is not just "blowing the whistle." Their role is also a matter
of helping the issuers commit wrongs. 4 It can be further argued that had the
lawyers warned the issuer of the flaws in the prospectus, the issuer could not
have issued the prospectus to the public and the investors would not have lost
their money as a result of their investment in a "bad" IPO. Due to the
"historic lack of enforcement" of the prospectus provisions, issuers may find
it rewarding to raise capital from the market by over looking their liability."
This is especially true if the lawyers agree with the issuer to go public with the
defective prospectus. Lawyers have the authority to control their issuers by
not certifying a defective prospectus as a "clean" one, and a person who
controls the issuer is also liable for the contravention of legal requirements by
the issuer.56 Lawyers exercise discretion in deciding on the contents of
disclosure in a prospectus. 7 At times, a law firm can be regarded as a primary
52. See In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. at 970.
53. Beatty & Welch, supra note 13, at 549.
54. Harrison, supra note 42, at 537.
55. Golding, supra note 10, at 404.
56. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Controlling Person Liability under Section 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities Act, 53 Bus. LAw. 1 (1997). Section 15
of the Securities Act of 1933 (U.S.) is applicable to sections 11-12, which imposes liability on various
persons including current and future or prospective directors of the issuers of IPO's. Hence, the controlling
persons' liability as set forth in section 15 is quite relevant.
57. Barondes,supra note 51, at410.
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violator for material misstatements or omissions contained in the prospectus.5 8
From this point of view, Melissa Harrison argues that civil liability should be
imposed on lawyers too. 9 In view of the above reasons, the imposition of
civil liability on lawyers is necessary for the protection of investors in the IPO
market in Bangladesh.
FUNCTIONS OF ISSUE MANAGERS AND RATIONALE FOR THEIR LIABILITY
FOR PROSPECTUSES
An issue manager has a significant role to play in the process of an IPO.
The issue manager prepares the prospectus and is responsible for the accuracy
of disclosures therein. The managers are required to provide a "due diligence
certificate" which confirms that the prospectus contains true, fair and adequate
disclosures.6 ° They are also involved in the pricing of the shares offered. As
a whole, the issue managers selected by the issuers control IPOs. 61 It is also
said that they sometimes have the most control over the issue.62 Further, the
issue manager "has de facto control over the actions" of the other participants
in an IPO, for example, underwriters.63 Despite this obligation of certification
of the adequacy and fairness of disclosures in a prospectus, the above-
mentioned prospectus liability laws of Bangladesh do not clearly impose any
liability on the issue manager. Managers should be liable on several counts,
i.e. for getting involved in the preparation of prospectuses, providing
confirmation of the fairness and adequacy of the disclosures, controlling their
issuers, as well as other participants in an IPO coalition.
In Stokes v. Lokken, the court held that a person is liable for a defective
prospectus if his or her participation is considered to be a significant and
substantial factor in the offering of securities.64 Courts have found defendants
liable for aiding and abetting the violation of disclosure requirements when
58. See generallyBreard v. Sachnoff& Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); Molecular Tech.
Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 913-14, 917-19 (6th Cir. 1991).
59. Harrison, supra note 42, at 537.
60. The "due diligence certificate" is required under regulation 14 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (Merchant Bankers and Portfolio Managers) Regulations of 1996. For an example of such
certificate, see the Prospectus issued by the Fu-Wang Foods Limited in April 2000 at 2.
61. Samuel N. Allen, A Lawyer's Guide to the Operation of Underwriting Syndicates, 26 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 319, 321 (1991).
62. SECURITIES UNDERWRITING: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 218 (Kenneth J. Bialkin & William J.
Grant, Jr. eds., 1985).
63. Allen, supra note 61, at 331.
64. 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981).
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they knowingly and substantially assisted the violation.65 Investors may
reasonably rely on the reputation of the issue managers in making their
investment decision.66 Thus, the issue managers are held liable for the
defective prospectus.
It is therefore clear that issue managers play a very crucial role in an IPO
for which civil liability has been imposed in some jurisdictions. However, in
Bangladesh there have been no clear provisions regarding the liability of issue
managers and therefore their liability for a defective prospectus is quite
unclear and uncertain despite their role in the preparation of the prospectus.
This ambiguity contributes to the exacerbation of the lack of investor
protection, which is contrary to the prime objective of the DBR.
DEFENCES AGAINST CIVIL LIABILITY FOR THE UNTRUE STATEMENTS IN
PROSPECTUSES
Section 145(2) of the CA'94 embedded some defences which are
available to persons liable for the disclosure of untrue statements in the
prospectus under Section 145(1). These defences can be divided into three
separate categories: withdrawal defence, due diligence defence and
expertisation defence.
WITHDRAWAL DEFENCE
In accordance with Section 145(2) of the CA'94, the withdrawal defence
has two prongs. One is applicable before the publication of the prospectus
and the other is applicable after its publication but before the allotment of
shares thereunder.
At the first stage, a prospective director is entitled to prove that he or she
withdrew his or her consent to be a director before the issue of the prospectus
and the prospectus was issued without his or her consent.
At the second stage, the defendants may prove that the prospectus in
question was issued without their knowledge or consent, and immediately on
becoming aware of the issue, they withdrew their consent and gave public
notice to that effect. If their consent was not withdrawn immediately after the
issue of the prospectus, the defendants may also prove that they withdrew
65. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1978);
Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279,287-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Caesars Palace See. Litig., 360 F. Supp.
366, 378-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
66. See In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
[Vol. 25:509
2005-06] INVESTOR PROTECTION & PROSPECTUS CIVIL LIABILITIES 523
their consent after the issue of the prospectus but before the allotment of
shares thereunder. To rely on this defence, the defendants are required to give
a public notice of withdrawal of their consent with reasons given thereof.
It is therefore clear that the withdrawal defence before the issue of the
prospectus is applicable only to the prospective directors. After the issue of
the prospectus, this defence is applicable to all defendants. The defendants
may claim this defence only when the allotment of shares under the prospectus
in question has not been made, and once the allotment is made no such
defence can be claimed.
The most important concern of the public about the withdrawal of consent
by a defendant seems to be the public notice to make the potential investors
aware of such a withdrawal. Without a public notice, the withdrawal of
consent by the prospective director may not have any implications for
potential investors. In the present provisions of the Bangladesh legislation,
there is room for misleading the potential investors about the identity of
directors. For example, Section 145(2)(a) entitles a prospective director to
withdraw his or her consent given to the prospectus before its issuance. But
the prospective director is not required to make the withdrawal public,
although he or she can rely on this defence of withdrawal in a legal suit
regarding the truth of the disclosures in the prospectus. There may be many
investors who subscribed for an IPO mainly because of the directorship of
such persons who have already withdrawn their consent to be directors before
the issuance, but after the preparation of the prospectus. The prospectus may
have been published with his or her name and no public notice given during
the subscription period.
It can be argued that the notification of the withdrawal of consent of a
proposed director may imply some serious problems with the IPO. The
investing public may be sceptical about the particular public offer because of
the public notice of the withdrawal of consent by the prospective directors. 7
This is because the investors may have had a general idea that the withdrawal
of consent by the prospective director might have followed the finding of
"weak fundamentals" of the shares to be issued. This argument could be
countered by saying that there might be some fatal problems with the truth of
disclosures affecting the merits of the public offer, which could make the offer
unworthy of investment. To save potential investors from being deceived by
the defective prospectus, and for the sake of enabling investors to make
67. See Greg Golding, Prospectus Misstatement Liability in the 1990s: Where Does the Director
Really Stand?, 7 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 177, 184 (1997).
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informed investment decisions, the withdrawal of the consent of prospective
directors with the reasons thereof should be made public. The investing
public must not be concerned about the offer ifa proposed director withdraws
his or her consent, given to the prospectus to be a director, on personal
grounds not related to the merit of the offer. If the reasons for such a
withdrawal are considered to be "degrading" quality of disclosures, they must
be published for the sake of investor protection as well as the integrity of the
market itself. A defective prospectus usually exploits the general investors
and diminishes investor confidence for which such disclosure is prejudicial to
the healthy running of the market. The non-disclosure of the withdrawal of
such a consent in the IPO market in Bangladesh is itself an omission to state
facts and appears to be more harmful for a market which has been suffering
from a severe lack of investor confidence for several years.
Further, it is not clear as to why the withdrawal of consent of prospective
directors should not be made public in a regime where the withdrawal of the
consent of other potential liable persons given to the prospectus is required to
be disclosed with reasons thereof.68 The purpose of such notification is for the
protection of investors and the integrity of the market. From the investors
point of view, it is thus submitted that the requirement for a reasonable public
notice should be equally applicable to the incumbent as well as proposed
directors in respect of the withdrawal of their consent given to the
prospectus.69 It is to be noted that the regulation should be directed to protect
the interests of the investors and the market, not to mislead them. The lack of
a requirement for issuing public notice of the withdrawal of consent of a
prospective director favours the issuer who exploits the ignorance and
innocence of investors. This favoritism is strictly contrary to investor
protection, which is the main objective of the disclosure philosophy.
DUE DILIGENCE DEFENCE
In a legal sense, the expression "due diligence" means "close examination
... of a transaction and its related documentation."7 In Universal Telecasters
68. Companies Act of 1994 § 145 (2)(b)-(c) (Bangl.).
69. In the U.S., the prospective director who has withdrawn his or her consent to the prospectus
before its issuance to the public is required to advise the Securities and Exchange Commission on such a
withdrawal. In such a situation, theU.S. securities regulator may givepublic noticewith regard to the said
withdrawal immediately after being advised by the prospective director concerned. Securities Act of 1933
§ II(b)(1) (U.S.).
70. BUTTERWORTHS AUSTRALIAN LEGAL DICTIONARY 393 (P.E. Nygh & P. Butt eds., 1997).
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(Qld) Ltd. v. Guthrie, it was held that "due diligence" refers to a minimum
standard of behaviour which is used to defend oneself against the violation of
regulatory or supervisory provisions so as to ensure that the particular system
was properly carried out.7 ' In Martin v. Hull, the court observed that the
ignorance of a defendant is no defence under the prospectus liability and that
some degree of competence in the performance of due diligence is expected.72
Under this defence in Bangladesh, defendants can escape their prospectus
liability for both an untrue statement and omission in the prospectus.
According to Section 145(2)(d)(i) of the CA'94, which deals with the due
diligence defence, the claim of exercising due diligence by the defendants can
be premised on the personal belief of the defendants about the truth of the
untrue statement incorporated in the prospectus. The defendants may prove
that, although the statement in question was not based on any expert opinion
or any official document, they had reasonable ground to believe, until the
allotment of shares thereunder, that the impugned statement was true.73
In keeping with judicial observation, mere personal belief may not be
sufficient to establish the due diligence defence. In this respect, the court in
SPCC v. Kelly held that general precautions are unlikely to be sufficient to
establish this defence; rather the defendants must show that their minds
concentrated on the potential risks associated with the transaction.74 The
persons who seek to use the due diligence defence "must always conduct the
due diligence investigation in person."'75
Although the corresponding laws of India and Malaysia do not require
investigation by the defendants to establish the due diligence defence, there
are some countries which have clearly established the requirement of
reasonable inquiries about the statements included in the prospectus.76 It is
broadly recognised that financial transactions in developed countries are much
more transparent than those of Bangladesh.77 Despite this fact, reasonable
71. (1978) 18 AL.R 531; 32 F.L.R. 360.
72. 92 F.2d 208, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
73. Companies Act of 1994 § 145(2)(d)(i) (Bangl.).
74. (1991) 5 A.C.S.R. 607 at 608-09.
75. See J.R. Lovejoy, Initial Public Offerings: The Due Diligence Process and Blue Sky Problems,
13 ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 369, 371 (1981).
76. Countries are, for example, the U.S., the U.K. and Australia. Details are provided in the next
subsection.
77. In terms of transparency in the activities of, amongst others, business people the scores/points
of the United Kingdom, Australia, United States, and Bangladesh were 8.7, 8.6, 7.7 and 1.2 out of 10
respectively. Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2002, http://www.transparency.org/
policy and research/surveys indices/cpi/2002 (last viewed 22 Feb. 2006). Those points in 2004 are 8.6,
8.8, 7.5 and 1.5 respectively. Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2004, http://www
JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE
inquiries by the defendants are required for this defence under the laws of
those countries, even if they rely on experts, public documents or opinions of
respective public officers. Details of requirements forreasonable inquiries are
explored below in analysing the expertisation defence in which the exercise
of due diligence is relevant.
EXPERTISATION DEFENCE
Under Section 145(2)(d)(ii)-(iii) of the CA'94 in Bangladesh, the
defendants of a suit for a prospectus containing an untrue statement may prove
that the statement fairly represented the extact statement provided by the
competent experts or respective officials, or was based on public documents.
These experts are required to show that they had reasonable grounds to
believe, and did believe until the allotment of shares under the impugned
prospectus, that the providers of those statements were competent persons, and
that they did not withdraw their consent given to the prospectus until the
allotment of shares.78
Just like the flaws which are embedded in the due diligence defence
discussed earlier, the weakness of the expertisation defence is the lack of
reasonable inquiries by the defendants about the competency of the experts,
the truth of their reports and the consistency between such reports and
pertinent information in the prospectus. Although such inquires are not
legally required in India and Malaysia, there are laws which obligate persons
involved in the preparation of a prospectus to carry out a reasonable
investigation if they were to rely on the due diligence defence." The
requirement of inquiries by the defendants limits their scope to escape their
liability for the defective prospectus. The narrower scope of defences leaves
little room for the defendants to avoid liabilities, which in turn facilitates to
widen the scope of remedies for the plaintiffs. But the laws of Bangladesh
suffer from a clear lack of investor protection in that they provide the
defendants with the due diligence defence based on personal belief, without
any corresponding requirements for reasonable inquires to justify their belief
in the untrue statement incorporated in the prospectus. Judicial approaches
.transparency.org/policy and research/surveys indices/cpi/2004 (last viewed 22 Feb. 2006).
78. Companies Act of 1994 § 145(2)(d)(ii)-(iii) (Bangl.).
79. In this respect, § I I(bX3)(A)-(B)of the Securities Act of 1933 (U.S.) requires the defendants
to conduct reasonable investigation if they were to rely on the due diligence defence. In Australia, § 731
of the Corporations Act of 2001 emphasises the requirement of reasonable personal inquiry for the due
diligence defence in respect of prospectus liability.
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about reasonable investigations further narrowed down the scope of
expertisation and the due diligence defence as discussed below.
POSITION OF EXECUTIVE AND NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN RESPECT OF
THE DUE DILIGENCE DEFENCE
A company usually appoints executive or non-executive directors.
According to the articulation of Section 145 of the CA'94, there is no
distinction between the executive and non-executive directors in respect of
defences against prospectus liability. However the courts of various common
law jurisdictions have clearly drawn a demarcation by saying that the
executive directors are not allowed to rely on the defence of expert reports.
For example, in. P. Coats v. Crossland, the court rejected the due diligence
defence and held that the blind acceptance of assurances regarding disclosures
in a prospectus given by a "self-interested party"8 will not be acceptable.8
On the other hand, in Stevens v. Hoare the court accepted this defence when
a non-executive director had given evidence that the grounds of his belief in
the truth of the statements made in the prospectus were the result of
reasonable inquiries carried out by the director of the legal advisers to the
issuer and management of the issuer. The court contended that such an
investigation is justified in the given circumstances.82
In Adams v. Thrift, a leading English case, non-executive directors failed
to establish the due diligence defence under the Directors Liability Act of
1890 (U.K.). In this case, the prospectus contained a number of misstatements
concerning the business of the issuer. The judge was not satisfied with the
80. An expert is considered to be one of the self-interested parties.
81. (1904) 20T.L.R. 800, 806 (U.K.).
82. In this case it was said that:
Had he reasonable ground for believing the statements in question to be true? It cannot be, and has
not been, said that he had no ground for so believing. But the case has been argued on the part of
the plaintiff as if the statute had required of a director not merely reasonable, but sufficient, grounds
for his belief. Indeed, it was rather suggested that a director is not entitled to rely upon the
assistance or advice of solicitors or clerks, but that with his own hands and eyes he must search out
and read every relevant document, and with his own mind judge of its operation and legal effect,
and that he is not entitled to state anything in a prospectus that could not depose to of his own
knowledge in a Court of justice. If so he would be bound to do a great deal more than the most
industrious and prudent man [or woman] of business could not think of doing, or in most cases
would be able to do, in the conduct of his own affairs .... And upon consideration of his evidence
and all the circumstances of the case it would in my opinion be wrong, and I cannot bring myself,
to conclude that he had not reasonable ground for such belief. I am of opinion that the defendant
had reasonable ground for believing the statements of the prospectus to be true.
(1904) 20 T.L.R. 407 at 409 (U.K.).
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requirement that the director believed that the statements furnished in the
prospectus were true. 3 The Adams case is authority for the proposition that
the blind reliance on a report or valuation by experts for prospectus statements
is not a reasonable ground to establish the due diligence defence. According
to this case, directors must take positive steps to know the truth of the
statements embodied in a prospectus before authorising them.84 This case thus
provides a clear direction for the company directors that the mere claim of the
due diligence defence is not sufficient to avoid liability as stated in the
statutes. Rather, the defendants need to be proactive to be familiar with the
disclosures made in the prospectus, including the expertised portion.
Further, executive directors are generally expected to know much more
than the non-executive directors about the affairs of the company. The burden
on the executive directors is much more onerous than that on the non-
executive directors in establishing the due diligence defence as is evident in
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp. (BarChris case), a leading American
authority. 5 The Court also held that the two portions of the prospectus,
expertised and non-expertised,86 cannot be treated alike for the purpose of the
due diligence defence. 7 The BarChris case imposed a stringent requirement
of knowledge upon the executive directors, which led to the conclusion that
liability will lie in all cases of misstatements.88
It would be more difficult to prove the due diligence defence for non-
expertised portions. The analysis of BarChris was strongly affirmed in Feit
v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. 9 In Deloitte Haskins and Sells
v. National Mutual Life Nominees, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand
rejected an argument that the non-executive directors should be subject to a
lower standard of care than that of the executive directors.9 ° In another U.S.
case, the court observed that the duty of a director to exercise due care, skill
and diligence in overseeing the affairs of a company cannot be met entirely by
relying on other persons and he or she needs to be familiar with the business
and financial condition of the entity.9 ' However, the approach of the court
83. (1915) 1 Ch. 557, 565-71 (U.K.).
84. Id.
85. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
86. For example, the financial statements that had been audited and certified by the accountants are
expertised part.
87. 283 F. Supp. at 683.
88. See id. at 684-92.
89. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
90. [1991] 5 N.Z.C.L.C. 67,418, 67,442-43 (C.A.) (N.Z.).
91. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. 1281, 1310 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
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demonstrated in the BarChris case has been criticised by Ernest Folk. 2 He
argued that a "director should be protected" if he or she depends on the
specific opinion of an independent legal counsel, for example, that "the
contested fact [is] immaterial or not false or [that] its omission [is] not
misleading in the context." 3 However, Folk pointed out that a director would
not be relieved from misstatement liability for relying on a vague opinion like
"you need not worry about it."9 4 There are also some arguments from
academics that the dependence on the specific advice of a competent lawyer
will be allowed as a due diligence defence even if the lawyer is wrong in
providing an opinion on the contested statement.95
In Daniels v. Anderson, the court in Australia expressed the view that
directors are under a duty to take necessary steps to know the affairs of the
company concerned and they owe the company a duty to exercise reasonable
care in discharging their official duties.96 The duty of care and reasonable
inquiry are closely related. The standard of care to be taken by a director has
been described in Adams v. Thrift as to the effect that the director satisfies a
requirement of appropriate inquiry based on the standard of a reasonable
person.97 This proposition was emphasised by the High Court of New Zealand
in R. v. Rada Corp. Ltd.98 The court treated the executive and non-executive
directors differently in respect of their reliance on the due diligence defence.
In this case, the position of executive directors had not been made clear, but
the court held that the non-executive directors would likely be able to
establish the defence.99
The preceding analysis suggests that, although the due diligence defence
has been in place in many countries, its scope of application is not wide
enough to escape the liability unduly. From the practical point of view, in this
age of accountability and transparency, a director should not be absolved from
misstatement liability on the grounds of the due diligence defence without
exercising reasonable care. The application of this defence is subject to the
92. See Folk, supra note 40, at 27-29.
93. Id. at 78.
94. Id.
95. See Douglas W. Hawes & Thomas J. Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in
Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1976); John C. Coffee Jr., Beyond the Shut Eyed
Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA.
L. REV. 1099, 1199-208 (1977).
96. (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759 (Austl.); (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 668 (Court of Appeals) (Austl.).
97. (1915) 1 Ch. 557, 565 (U.K.).
98. [1990] 5 N.Z.C.L.C. 66,625 (H.C.) (N.Z.).
99. Id. at 66,647-48.
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exercise of reasonable care to verify the truth of the statements which are to
be incorporated into a prospectus. The blind belief in the advice of other
people will not be sufficient to establish this defence. Exeutive directors, i.e.,
the insiders of the issuer, have greater responsibility to carry out inquiries
about the truth of the prospectus statements than do outsiders.
However, in Bangladesh, as alluded to earlier, Section 145 of the CA'94
does not require reasonable investigation by the defendants to establish the
due diligence defence. In effect, the absence of this requirement has widened
the scope of the defendants to escape the prospectus liabilities at the expense
of investor protection in the IPO market. As regards the withdrawal defence,
the lack of requirements for issuing public notice of the withdrawal of consent
given by a prospective director to the prospectus has been shown to be
prejudicial to the interests of investors. Therefore, the due diligence defence
without reasonable care and the withdrawal of consent without public notice
will implicitly support the impropriety of the persons involved in the
preparation of a prospectus, which is prejudicial to the interests of the
investors. These legal lacunae are contrary to the concept of protecting the
interests of investors in the Bangladesh IPO market.
REQUIREMENTS OF RELIANCE BY INVESTORS UPON PROSPECTUSES AND THE
ELEMENTS OF CAUSATION FOR COMPENSATION
In Bangladesh, under Section 145(1) of the CA'94, investors are entitled
to recover their loss or damages, sustained by subscribing to an IPO, from
persons who are liable. The right of investors to get compensation is subject
to two requirements. First, the investors have to prove that their investment
decisions were made in reliance on the prospectus and second, that the loss or
damage claimed was the result of the untrue statements incorporated into the
prospectus. Subscribers will have no remedy if they rely on anything other
than the prospectus, such as, the reputation of the promoters, directors and
underwriters.
The above conditions are regarded as obstacles to the enforcement of the
investors' rights to recover damages. This is so because, in practice, investors,
especially in a lesser developed country like Bangladesh, usually make their
investment decisions having more reliance on the name and fame of the
persons involved in the issue, rather than on the quality of disclosures made
in the prospectus. Nevertheless, under the current liability provisions, the
investors are not entitled to seek compensation for their loss or damages
caused by the untrue statement, unless the reliance and causation elements are
proved.
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Considering the importance of compensation to the investors and the
difficulty of proving their reliance on the prospectus, in some developed
countries the investors are not required to prove such reliance. In this respect,
it can be taken for granted that the investors in developed countries are better
educated and trained and they generally invest in IPOs upon the advice of their
investment advisers. Despite this fact, their laws do not require the investors
to prove their reliance on the prospectus. For example, in Canada, Section
130(1) of the Securities Act of 1990 (Ontario) does not require the element of
reliance on the prospectus for the purpose of claiming compensation. Instead,
the section provides that a purchaser of securities offered to the public through
a prospectus containing a misrepresentation "shall be deemed to have relied
on such misrepresentation if it was a misrepresentation at the time of purchase
and [an investor] has a right of action for damages." In the U.S., Sections 11
and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, which deal with prospectus liability, do
not provide for this reliance requirement. Actually, Section 11 (a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 requires the plaintiffs to prove their reliance on the
registration statement, "but such reliance may be established without proof of
the reading of the registration statement by any person." Therefore, this
requirement is less restrictive than that of Bangladesh.
In the U.S., Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, which directly deals
with the prospectus, has imposed the onus of proof of investors' non-reliance
on the disclosures upon the defendants. In accordance with this section,
defendants have to prove that the compensation claimed by the plaintiffs is not
the result of the "defect" of the prospectus. Thus, the plaintiffs need not prove
their reliance on the impugned prospectus for the recovery of their loss or
damage resulting from their investments in a "bad" IPO in the US.
In Australia, Section 729(1) of the Corporations Act of 2001 imposes
liability on certain persons to pay compensation to the investors. Such a
person is liable "even if the person did not commit, and was not involved in,
the contravention" of disclosure requirements as set forth in Section 728.
These persons, as mentioned earlier, "are almost absolutely liable"' 0 and the
investors are not required to prove their reliance on the prospectus for
claiming compensation.'0 '
The older cases show that the plaintiffs were required to prove their
reliance on the prospectus to recover their compensation because the
100. 1 KEN ROBSON, ROBSON'S ANNOTATED CORPORATIONS LAw 895 (5th ed. 2000).
101. Corporations Act of 2001 § 729 (Austl.).
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legislation at the time required it.' At present, to prevent well-known
business persons from using their names in a defective prospectus, the
requirement for the reliance on the prospectus by the investors is completely
irrelevant,'0 3 and the purchaser is not required to prove due diligence.'0 4
Therefore, although the laws of the markets having the majority of
sophisticated investors and the availability of professional investment advisers
no longer require the investors to prove their reliance on the prospectus to
recover the loss or damages arising out of their investments in defective
prospectuses, the law of Bangladesh still imposes this burden on investors.
This requirement ultimately precludes the investors a priori from their right
to claim compensation from their investment in a defective prospectus.
Moreover, the dearth of judicial interpretation of prospectus liability in
Bangladesh may magnify the general perception that the reliance element is
an obstacle for the recovery of loss or damages under Section 145 of the
CA'94. In practice, the test of reliance on the prospectus is a subjective test
which is very difficult to prove by evidence.
Regarding the causation element, the onus of proof on the plaintiff that
the loss or damage is the result of the untrue statement included in the
prospectus is considered to be another hindrance to the investors' right to be
compensated for their investment in a "bad" IPO. The imposition of this
burden of proof of causation seems to be an extra burden for the investors,
particularly in Bangladesh. Such an imposition in some developed markets
may be reasonable because sophisticated investors dominate those markets.
In addition, professional advisory services are also available in those markets.
But this is not the case in Bangladesh where the dominant unsophisticated
investors, in practice, rely on the brand name of the issuer and the persons
involved in the findraising process.' In such a situation, it can be seen that
the present requirements in Bangladesh of proving investors' good faith on the
prospectus or their reliance on the disclosure in subscribing for an IPO, as
well as the element of proving causation of the loss or damage claimed by the
investors, can be perceived as obstacles to the rights of investors to seek the
civil remedy provided under Section 145 of the CA'94.
102. See Baty v. Keswick, (1901) 85 LT. 18 (Eng.). As to the meaning of"on the faith of," see
MacLeay v. Tait, [1906] A.C. 24 (H.L.) (U.K.).
103. Globus v. Law Research Service Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970).
104. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005,
1008 (1981).
105. M. Rahman, "Devil" and Future of Share Market, PROTHOM ALo (Dhaka, Bangl.), 18 Dec.
1999 (translated from Bengali).
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LIABILITY UNDER THE COMMON LAW OF TORTS
The common law of torts imposes civil liability on all participants in an
IPO coalition. 10 6 These participants include directors, promoters, auditors,
lawyers and the issue managers. Therefore, the persons who do not fall within
the ambit of the civil liability referred to earlier are liable to the investors
under the common law of torts."' The liability under the common law is
based on the tort of deceit and the tort of negligence.
LIABILITY UNDER THE TORT OF DECEIT
The remedy under the tort of deceit is available against a fraudulent
misrepresentation where the person making the statement in question knew
that the statement was false, or he or she was reckless as to whether it was true
or false.
Although the common law imposes liability on all of the participants in
the process of prospectus preparation, the enforcement of the tort of deceit has
become extremely difficult after the adoption of a fraudulent standard of
behaviour for liability as set forth in Derry v. Peek"0 8 more than a century
ago. °9 In this case, Lord Herschell insisted on proof by the plaintiffs "that a
false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its
truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false."" 0 However, the
representation need not be made directly to the plaintiff."' In this regard, the
decision of the House of Lords in Peek v. Gurney also contributed to making
it difficult to prove deceit." 2 The House of Lords restricted the scope of the
liability arising out of a false statement in a prospectus as it presumes that the
intention of the prospectus was not to deceive the investors but to enable the
company to find people to acquire its shares.' In an earlier case, Polhill v.
Walter, it was held that, to get a remedy under the common law of deceit, the
plaintiffs will have to prove that the defendants must have lacked an honest
106. See Hedley Byme & Co. v. Heiler & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) (U.K.).
107. KRISHNAN ARJUNAN, COMPANY LAW IN MALAYSIA: CASES AND COMMENTARY 139 (1998).
108. [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.) (U.K.).
109. Golding, supra note 67, at 187. See also JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 633 (8th ed.
1992).
110. Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (H.L.) (U.K.).
111. Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney v. R.H. Brown & Co., (1972) 126 C.L.R. 337,343 (Austl.).
112. (1873) L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (U.K.).
113. Peek v. Gurney, (1873) L.R. 6 H.L. 377, 400 (U.K.).
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belief in the truth of the statement in question."4 Even recklessness in the
sense of gross negligence will not be sufficient to recover compensation
unless the defendants are consciously unresponsive to the truth." 5 Hence,
seeking a remedy under the tort of deceit is practically difficult for the
investors and unenforceable to a great extent.
In the Madhya Pradesh High Court of India case of S. Chatteree vs. K
L. Bhave, it was said that:
In order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing short of
that will suffice. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been
made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly careless whether
it be true or false." 6
The court also pointed out that the tort of deceit is not completed unless
the false report is acted upon and such a report has resulted in loss or damage.
This interpretation of the tort of deceit is followed in the Indian
subcontinent." 7 The observation of the Indian High Court is similar to the
decision in Derry v. Peek in the sense that both cases dealt with the proof of
fraud. In Derry v. Peek, it was said that "a man who makes a statement
without care and regard for its truth or falsity commits fraud.""' 8 Seeking a
remedy by a plaintiff under the tort of deceit is therefore practically difficult
because of the problems involved in proving the elements of fraud.
Further, directors are not liable for a misstatement in the prospectus if
they claimed that they honestly believed the statement true at the time it was
made. As it was held in Baron Uno Carl v. Rotf de Mare, it would be
sufficient if a director honestly believed the statement to be true in the sense
in which he or she understood it.' Similarly, in this regard, the High Court
of Australia held that, "[i]n order to succeed in fraud, a representee must
prove, inter alia, that the representor had no honest belief in the truth of the
representation in the sense in which the representor intended it to be
understood.' 120 Thus it depends on a subjective test. In such a situation, it
should be very difficult for the plaintiffs to disprove the director's claim of his
or her honest belief in the truth of a statement which is actually untrue. In
114. (1832) 3 B. & A.D. 115, 124 (U.K.); (1832) 110 E.R. 43,46 (U.K.).
115. Lamb v. Johnson, (1914) 15 S.R. (N.S.W.)65 at 74-75.
116. (1960) A.I.R. (M.P.) 323 (Madhya Pradesh H.C.).
117. M. ZAHIR, COMPANY AND SECURITIEs LAws 131 (2000).
118. [18891 14 App. Cas. 337, 350 (H.L.) (U.K.).
119. [1959] 3 W.L.R 108, 114 (Eng).
120. Krakowski v. Eurolynx Properties Ltd., (1995) 183 C.L.R. 563, 578 (Austl.).
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addition, as expounded in the above-mentioned S. Chatterjee v. K L. Bhave,
it is to be proved that the plaintiff acted upon the false statements and the loss
or damage incurred by the plaintiff is the result of such statements. These
requirements make the plaintiffs' claims under the tort of deceit difficult to
prove before the court. Commenting on this issue, Louis Loss and Joel
Seligman said that it is very difficult for plaintiffs to get a remedy on the basis
of fraud or deceit.' 2' As a result, the remedy available under the common law
tort of deceit is not a useful remedy to investors in Bangladesh.
LIABILITY UNDER THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE
The essence of this liability is the duty of care. InMutualLife & Citizens
Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Evatt, the Privy Council held that the duty of care is
only imposed on a person who carries on a business, or profession, which
involves providing a kind of advice calling for a special skill and
competence.'22 In this regard, the High Court of Australia in Shaddock &
Associates Pty. Ltd. v. Parramatta City Council held that a duty of care arises
"whenever a person gives information or advice to another upon a serious
matter in circumstances where the speaker realizes, or ought to realize, that he
[or she] is being trusted to give the best of his [or her] information or
advice. ,,123 Liability for negligence arises even though the misstatement
is made honestly and regardless of the existence of a fiduciary or contractual
relationship between the parties of a suit concerning prospectus
misstatements.'24 In accordance with these observations, every person who
has an involvement in the preparation of a prospectus is under a duty of care
to provide accurate information in the prospectus.
The liability for the tort of negligence in respect of prospectus
misstatements is not of much importance in many countries. This is so
because the statutory liability in this regard imposes a negligence standard of
conduct on every person involved in the public offering of securities.'25 The
persons who are negligent in preparing a prospectus will be held liable under
statutory provision because of their failure to establish the due diligence
121. See VII Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3421-448 (3d ed. 1989).
122. [1971] A.C. 793, 803 (P.C.) (U.K.).
123. (1981) 150 C.L.R. 225, 250 (Austl.).
124. See Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heler & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (U.K.).
125. As discussed earlier, statutory civil liability of persons involved in the preparation of a
prospectus is subject to some defences such as due diligence. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 208 (1975).
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defence. Conversely, if they successfully establish the due diligence defence
in a suit filed under statutory laws, they can easily win the suit under the
common law of negligence depending on the same evidence used in the
proceeding under the statutory law. Thus, the negligence element under the
common law is now of less significance because of its incorporation into the
statutes. The common law of negligence therefore does not provide the
investors with any extra means of remedy in reality for their loss or damage
sustained from their investments in a defective prospectus. However, the
discussion on the tort of negligence suggests that all persons involved in the
preparation of a defective prospectus should be held liable to compensate the
investors who have suffered loss or damage by investing in such a prospectus.
It can be seen from the above discussion that the common law remedies
for untrue statements included in the prospectus are not much help for
investors in Bangladesh. The common law remedies are available regardless
of the regulatory philosophy (the MBR or DBR). These remedies do not
warrant to be specially mentioned in looking for the protection for investors
in the disclosure regime.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF THE CIVIL LIABILITY
TO ALL PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATION OF PROSPECTUSES
It may be argued that the imposition of potential civil liability on the
auditors, underwriters, issue managers and lawyers will "chill" their
participation, resulting in the reduction in the number of new IPOs. This may
be partly true, because such a negative effect has been suggested, especially
in high risk and high technology industries.'26 General investors are usually
unable to assess the risks associated with the IPOs. Moreover, the complex
and scientific nature of such an industry at times makes the prospectus more
difficult to allow an informed assessment. This is evident in Klein v.
Computer Devices Inc. in which the plaintiffs complained that the prospectus
failed to disclose the technical reasons for which the primary product of the
issuer was substantially unmarketable.'27 If it is difficult for market
professionals of a developed jurisdiction like the market in the U.S. to
discover the errors and complexities, it would certainly be impossible for the
126. See, for details, Richard Greene, Why Underwriters Are Nervous, FORBES, 12 Sept. 1983, at
164; Edward F. Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of Underwriters Distributing Securities Within
an Integrated Disclosure System, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 760-62 (1981).
127. 591 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The primary products in this case were portable computers
which used 3.5 inch disk drives rather than 5.25 inch disk drives.
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average investors in Bangladesh to discover these. If an IPO is really risky
and the nature of risk is difficult to understand generally, the investors should
be better off without such a public offer.
The impact of the lack of investors' ability to make informed decisions
in the true sense in a disclosure regime is evident in the reality of the share
market in Bangladesh. It is a fact that many companies, having poor economic
fundamentals, have been taking advantage of innocent investors in Bangladesh
in collaboration with the professionals and intermediaries of issuers' choice.I28
Further, recent surveys showed that companies listed after the introduction of
the DBR have raised huge amounts of money from general investors by
making "palatable" disclosures in their prospectuses and that funds have been
reportedly misappropriated (by the management of the companies).' 29
From the practical point of view, it can be said that only the securities
with high risks are likely to be reduced as a consequence of the imposition of
liabilities on the professionals and intermediaries involved in the preparation
of a prospectus. Such a decline in IPOs will not be detrimental to the market
in the long run and the impediment to the issue of shares associated with high
risks is desirable from the viewpoint of investor protection, especially in a
country like Bangladesh. The reason is that once the confidence of investors
is impaired by the "bad offers," the "good offers" will fail to attract investors
in some cases. 30 Thus the bad offers eventually reduce the IPOs and cannot
contribute to the development of the share market. In respect of corporate
fundraising, John Coffee observes that statutory "liabilities . . . give this
128. A total of 19 IPOs out of 52 issued between 1998 and 2003 are very poor in respect of
fundamentals. SeeADB's Capital Market Dev. Project "Little Productive," THE NEW AGE (Dhaka, Bangl.)
1 June 2003.
129. See for details, K.A. Mansoor, Share Scandal: Some Companies Looted 500 Crore Taka,
DAILY JANAKANTHA (Dhaka, Bangl.), 15 June 2002. See also H. Mahmud, Halfofthe SECApproved 137
Companies Do Not Give Dividends, Do Not HoldAGMs: Investors Are being Deceived Because ofLegal
Lacuna, PROTHOM ALo (Dhaka, Bangl.) 4 July 2004 (translated from Bengali); ADB 's CapitalMarketDev.
Project "Little Productive, " THE NEW AGE (Dhaka, Bangl.) 1 June 2004.
130. In the case of 1998, a total of 20 companies obtained consent from the SEC to float, but only
five companies went public and the remaining 15 companies could not float because of the lack of investor
confidence in the market. The Managing Director of oneof the 15 companies said that "[w]e did not take
risk to float shares in the depressed market where investors continuously rejected the IPOs." Two of the
five companies which floated were rejected by the investors and another one narrowly escaped
undersubscrition. See for details, M.S. Rahman, Many Companies Unwilling to Float IPOs Fearing
Undersubscription, DAILY STAR (Dhaka, Bangl.), 12 Apr. 1998. Further, at the end of 1999, eight
insurance companies suspended their plan to go public because of lack of investor confidence in the
country's primary share market. See M.S. Rahman, Eight Insurance Companies Shelve Their Plans to Go
Public, DAILY STAR (Dhaka, Bangl.), 12 Dec. 1999.
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person a strong incentive to monitor for law violation by others and little
incentive to cheat itself."' 3'
An appropriate legal regime and its effective enforcement help establish
the rule of law which can contribute largely to increasing IPOs' 32 Coffee
observes that "[1]iability must be addressed legislatively."'' Hence, statutory
liability has been argued to be more useful to accord better protection to the
investors in IPO markets than liability based on the common law of torts. This
is more important in Bangladesh because the culture of litigation under the
common law of torts is yet to be developed. At the same time, the passivity
of investors in relation to suing under the statutory law for the recovery of
their loss or damages resulting from the defective prospectus is clearly evident
from the paucity of reported cases. In such circumstances, the expectation for
the enforcement of liability under the common law of torts for prospectuses
seems to be unrealistic.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The DBR has emerged to meet the needs of developed markets and
Bangladesh has adopted this disclosure philosophy following the path of
developed markets without any commensurate amendments to the laws
pertinent to the prospectus. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the
civil liability regime for the defective prospectus in Bangladesh is ambiguous,
unclear and narrow as compared to that of other selected countries. This
weakness has been measured in terms of the extent of the scope of civil
liabilities and defences available to escape from these liabilities. The analysis
shows that the civil liability of auditors, underwriters, lawyers and issue
managers for the prospectus is unclear in the current statutory liability
provisions in Bangladesh. Even their position in respect of prospectus
liabilities has never been clarified by the courts due to the dearth of cases.
The existing uncertainty regarding their statutory civil liability is considered
to be unfavourable to investor protection in the IPO market. Any ambiguity
would help create confusion about the scope and applicability of the law
concerned. In recognition of the importance of the role of those professionals
and intermediaries involved in the IPO markets, civil liability has been
imposed on them in some jurisdictions as discussed earlier.
131. John C. Coffee Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate over Company
Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L.R. 1143, 1169 n.72 (1995).
132. La Porta et al., supra note 1, at 1143.
133. Coffee Jr., supra note 131, at 1187.
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Although liability has been specifically imposed on the directors and
promoters of the issuing companies in Bangladesh, the statutory defences have
further weakened their liability to compensate investors.
It is widely conceded that the above professional and intermediary
services are fairer in the developed countries as compared to those of many
developing and least developed countries. The situation in Bangladesh is
worst in respect of transparency, as is evident from some recent studies. The
Berlin based Transparency International has placed Bangladesh at the top of
the Corruption Perception Index as the most corrupt country in the world in
the last four consecutive years."' In line with the Transparency International
report, another recent survey conducted by the Centre for Policy Dialogue
(CPD), a leading research institution in Bangladesh, reveals a similar finding
implying that one of the major impediments to investment in Bangladesh is
corruption.'35 Further, in June 2002, ajoint report of the World Bank and the
United Nations Development Program on "Bangladesh Financial
Accountability for Good Governance" showed that the country's accounts and
auditing processes still lack transparency and accountability. The report also
mentioned that financial management is still not up to international
standards.'36 Another alarming piece of information recently published is that
the various banks and credit unions have disbursed a huge amount of money
as loans against the deposition of fake shares of different listed companies.
The amount involved was about one billion Taka (approximately U.S. $17.5
million) in the period between 1996 and 2000,'17 while the total market
capitalisation of the Dhaka Stock Exchange was 54 billion Taka as of 30 June
2000.38 There are widespread allegations that company officials, amongst
others, are also involved in procuring fake shares. Even the business leaders
themselves have testified that corruption has been eating away the economic
growth of the country.
139
134. Most Corrupt for Fourth Time-Government Rejects TIReport, DAILY STAR (Dhaka, Bangl.),
21 Oct. 2004.
135. The other major impediment is violence/terrorism. See Report on CPD Survey, DAILY
JUGANTOR (Dhaka, Bangl.), 28 Aug. 2002. The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) carried out the survey
upon the recommendation of the World Economic Forum (WEF) as a test of eligibility to take part in the
2003 Competition of World Economic Forum. The survey report ofthe CPD was released just a day ahead
of the report of Transparency International.
136. WB, UNDP Report on Bangladesh: Corruption Eats 40% of Public Fund, NEW NATION
(Dhaka, Bangl.), 4 June 2002.
137. R.M. Chowdhury, Formation ofStrong Probe Body Demanded: Fake Share Scam, FINANCIAL
EXPRESS (Dhaka, Bangl.), 15 Aug. 2002.
138. Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report 1999-2000, at 11.
139. Business Leaders Say: Violence, Corruption Eat Up Economic Growth, NEw NATION (Dhaka,
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It goes without saying that the current chronic lack of investor confidence
in the securities market in Bangladesh is the result of the various malfeasance
practised by companies in collaboration with their intermediaries and
professionals. 4 Despite this reality, the statutory civil liability of the
professionals and intermediaries involved in the corporate fundraisingprocess
is unclear and uncertain. Although civil liability may be imposed on them
under the common law of torts, the implications for liability under the
common law have been shown to be insignificant for investor protection.
Hence, statutory liability is considered to be of paramount importance for the
protection of investors. The uncertainty surrounding the liability of the
professionals and intermediaries working with the IPO coalition displays legal
lacunae with regard to the liability for the prospectus. The obligation created
by law for securities regulation must be clear and "easily understandable."''
The shortcomings of the CA'94 in imposing liability on the members of
the IPO coalition, in association with a wide range of defences provided by
both the statutes and the common law, have made the whole liability regime
difficult to enforce.
In addition, the investors' onus of proof of their reliance on the
prospectus, and the loss or damage being caused by the untrue statement
included in the prospectus, are further impediments to the recovery of
compensation for their investments in an IPO. The fact that this onus has not
been imposed on the investors in some developed jurisdictions has been
discussed.
The ambiguity of the law in imposing liability for the contravention of
disclosure requirements, provisions for the broad scope of defences and
difficulties in proving the onus imposed on investors, have ultimately lessened
the usefulness and the scope of the application of prospectus liabilities in
Bangl.), 18 Aug. 2002.
140. The SEC lodged a First Information Report (FIR) with a police station against three directors,
auditors and issue managers of the IPO after necessary investigation. The investigation reveals that "....
directors injected forged allotment letters into the stock market and siphoned huge amount of money by
deceiving the general investors." See for detail, M.S. Rahrnan, Complaints Lodged with Moto'heel Thana
[police Station]: SEC Finds JH Directors, 3 Firms Involved in Share Forgery, DAILY STAR (Dhaka,
Bangl.), 22 Dec. 1999; SEC Files FIR against 5 JH directors in Share Forgery, FINANCIAL EXPRESS
(Dhaka, Bangl.), 22 Dec. 1999. Further, the relationship between the companies and their auditors is so
unethical that the SEC had to promulgate a new rle to combat professional unfairness and unethical
conduct. In accordance with this new rule issued by the SEC on 26 November 2001, companies were
barred from appointing the same audit firms consecutively for more than three years. D.N. Saha, New SEC
Law Removes Monopoly ofAudit Firms, THE INDEPENDENT (Dhaka, Bangl.), 14 Nov. 2001.
141. Michael D. Mann, What Constitutes a Successful Securities Regulatory Regime, 3 AUSTL. J.
CORP. L. 178, 180 (1993).
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Bangladesh. As a consequence, the civil liability regime has appeared to be
inappropriate for the DBR. It is to be taken into account that the "[l]aw's
effectiveness depends initially on its drafting, and later on the interpretation
given to it by judges and commentators."' 42 The drawbacks of criminal
liabilities will demonstrate further weaknesses of the law relating to the
prospectus, but that investigation will be carried out in another endeavour.
142. Razeen Sappideen, Economics, Law and Business Ethics: Some Reflections, 25 AUSTL. Bus.
L. REv. 422, 430 (1997).
